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ABSTRACT
We present a theory of truth in ﬁction that improves on Lewis’s [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in
two ways. First, we expand Lewis’s possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal
or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in ﬁction as (make-believed) belief
revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections
raised against Lewis’s original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
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1. Introduction
Fictions are generally not true, but we can truthfully talk of what happens in them—
including what they are not explicit about. When Heathcliff and Catherine meet for the
ﬁnal time in Wuthering Heights, Heathcliff is dressed in the manner of an eighteenth-
century country gentleman, not as a circus clown. Yet the text of that scene says noth-
ing about how Heathcliff is dressed. So, what is true in the ﬁction of Wuthering Heights
goes beyond what’s explicitly written in the text. Such going beyond is difﬁcult to model.
The modal analyses proposed by Lewis [1978] have been the go-to approach for
truth in ﬁction. However, they have faced serious objections (for a summary, see Sains-
bury [2010: ch. 4]). We improve on Lewis’s ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand
his possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds that repre-
sent some impossibility as being the case [Kiourti 2010; Berto 2012; Nolan 2013; Jago
2014]. Second, we take ideas from belief revision theory [Grove 1988; Segerberg 2001;
Baltag and Smets 2011] to give truth conditions for sentences of the form ˹In ﬁction
f, A˺ that avoid all of the main criticisms faced by Lewis.
In section 2, we introduce Lewis’s Analyses 0, 1, and 2, and some major objections
advanced against them. In section 3, we deal with a difﬁculty that depends on Lewis’s
working only with possible worlds. In section 4, we present our improved version of
Analysis 2. In section 5, we show how it solves Lewis’s problems.
2. Lewis on Truth in Fiction
We say ‘In Star Trek’s world…’ and ‘In the world of The Lord of the Rings…’. We may
thus understand truth in ﬁction along the lines of truth relative to a world. One may
take the world of Wuthering Heights as one that is compatible with everything stated
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explicitly in the novel. But unreliable narrators can explicitly state something that turns
out, later on, not to be true in the ﬁction, or can make claims tongue-in-cheek. We shall
only take into account reliable narration, in which a narrator’s explicitly claiming that
A is sufﬁcient for A’s being true in the ﬁction. This seems the default situation when we
engage with works of ﬁction.1 We thus endorse this principle as a default rule:
EXPLICIT. If ˹A˺ occurs explicitly in the story f, then ˹A˺ is true in f and so also ˹Inf , A˺ is true.
2
‘Inf, A’ abbreviates ‘In the ﬁction f, A’, where ‘f’ is a placeholder for the title of some ﬁction
3
and ‘A’ is a placeholder for (depending on context) a sentence or a proposition.4
The worlds complying with the explicit content of Wuthering Heights are all worlds
in which Heathcliff is adopted by Mr Earnshaw, comes to own Thrushcross Grange,
marries Isabella. We speak of worlds now, as Lewis [1978] proposes that we associate a
plurality of them with the ﬁction: although the explicit content of the novel narrows
down the class of worlds to those compatible with it, we cannot fulﬁl our initial hope to
get the unique world ofWuthering Heights. Given ﬁction f, there generally are sentences
A such that neither is it true in f that A nor is it true in f that :A. We cannot distinguish
between a world where Frodo has an even number of hair on his feet and a world where
that number is odd. In a formal representation, that is :Inf , A ^ :Inf , :A. So, for
some ﬁction f and sentence A, we have :(Inf, A _ Inf , :A).5
Lewis [ibid.: 39] also claims that we should individuate ﬁctional stories by looking at
particular acts of storytelling: ﬁctions with the same explicit content will differ when
uttered by different authors on different occasions. This suggests that acts of storytell-
ing are individuated by their respective utterers as well as by the place and time of utter-
ance. This, however, generates a tension with Lewis’s proposal, one page later, on how
to select the relevant worlds [ibid.: 40]:
The worlds we should consider, I suggest, are the worlds where the ﬁction is told, but as known
fact rather than ﬁction. The act of storytelling occurs, just as it does here at our world; but there
it is what here it falsely purports to be: truth-telling.
Following Searle [1975], for Lewis there is a distinction between what the act of story-
telling amounts to in our world and what it amounts to in other worlds. At our world,
the author is pretending to tell something as known fact, or to be someone telling the
story as known fact. At other worlds, someone is uttering something lexically identical
but telling it as known fact. In writing Wuthering Heights, Bront€e is not performing an
illocutionary act of assertion. She is pretending to be someone, Lockwood or Nelly,
who is asserting the story.
1 Heyd [2006] proposes to account for unreliable narration pragmatically via Gricean maxims. Unreliable narra-
tion is much discussed in literary theory (see Riggan [1981] and K€oppe and Kindt [2011]).
2 We will normally avoid corner quotes when context disambiguates.
3 Under which conditions a work counts as a ﬁction, or two ﬁctions are identical, is often not so clear. For discus-
sion of the former, see Searle [1975], Currie [1990], Friend [2012], and Matravers [2014]. For the latter, see L€owe
[2010]. We lack the space here to deal with these issues.
4 Following Folde [2011], ‘˹Inf , A˺ is true’, ‘it’s true in ﬁction f that A’, and ‘in the ﬁction f, it is true that A’ will be
treated as equivalent.
5 Incompleteness with respect to A does not entail that, for some f and A, we have :(Inf , A _ :Inf , A). But if a
ﬁction f is incomplete with respect to A, then :Inf , A; thus, given _-introduction, Inf , A _ :Inf , A for the particular
A and f. Also, f’s incompleteness with respect to A should not entail that Inf , :(A _ :A) . Although neither InLOTR
(The Lord of the Rings), Frodo is right-handed, nor InLOTR, Frodo is left-handed, it seems true that InLOTR, (Frodo is
left-handed _ Frodo is right-handed). This does not rule out the possibility of ﬁctions f and sentences A, such
that, Inf , :(A _ :A).
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Then the sameness of the acts cannot be based on their being the same kind of
speech act. Moreover, the story is told by different people: at our world by the author,
and at other possible worlds by the narrator, who is not necessarily (cross-worldly)
identical to the author. So, we should have different acts of storytelling merely because
they correspond to different acts of utterance. Thus, it seems to us, the sameness of the
act(s) of storytelling can only lie in their lexical identity: we should consider worlds w
such that if in the actual world the author of f pretends to tell f as known fact in act a,
then in w the narrator of f tells f as known fact in act a, where a and aare lexically iden-
tical. This excludes the actual world as a candidate for one of our chosen worlds. For
even when author and narrator are identical, pretending to assert A and asserting A
cannot occur in the same act of utterance [ibid.].
Now for the core issue: the implicit content of a ﬁction. Lewis starts with Analysis 0:
˹Inf, A˺ is true iff at every world where the story f is told as known fact, rather than as
ﬁction, A is true. Whenever the author pretended to assert that A, the narrator, in tell-
ing A as known fact, asserts A. Together with our restriction to reliable narrators, this
implies that the worlds where the story is told as known fact are those where the explicit
content is true.
Because in Analysis 0 the ﬁctional operator is just a restricted quantiﬁer over possi-
ble worlds, whatever necessarily follows from a truth in the ﬁction is itself true in the
ﬁction. It will be true in Wuthering Heights that (assuming classical logic) either
Heathcliff loves Catherine or doesn’t, and (assuming that the mental metaphysically
depends on the physical) that his tortured mental life supervenes on various physical
facts about him. Any necessary truth will be true in any ﬁction: that Fermat’s Last The-
orem holds, that there exist properties, that truth is grounded in obtaining states of
affairs (assuming that these are metaphysical truths). Proudfoot [2006] takes these as
unwelcome results; we will return to them.
There must be further constraints on the set of worlds of Wuthering Heights. It
might seem intuitive that gravity obeys an inverse square law in Wuthering Heights,
just as it does in reality, although Bront€e never says so explicitly. We might take the
worlds of Wuthering Heights to be those nomologically possible worlds compatible
with what’s explicitly stated in the text. Also, to grasp the novel we need to understand
something about the social customs of late eighteenth-century England. Heathcliff
leaves, becomes wealthy, returns as a gentleman. To get the importance of those events,
we need to understand something of England’s attitudes to class and gender in the eigh-
teenth century. Bront€e took for granted that her contemporary readers would easily get
these. So, we may further restrict the worlds of the ﬁction to those compatible with var-
ious social norms.
If we restrict to nomologically possible worlds, though, how are we to understand
Catherine’s ghost? Ghosts are physically impossible. On this way of constraining, we
must say that the narrator (Lockwood) is either lying (hence unreliable) or hallucinat-
ing. This may fail to make good sense of Wuthering Heights. The approach makes even
worse sense of any ghost story with a reliable narrator (for example, Canterville Ghost),
where nomologically impossible events are central to the plot.
As for social customs, Will Self’s Great Apes tells the story of a man who wakes up as
an ape, in a society in which apes are socially superior to humans. Many of our social
norms are turned on their head: a good Catholic should be as sexually promiscuous as
possible. The worlds of Great Apes don’t share our social rules.
Overall, on the one hand, Analysis 0 doesn’t import enough: it does not account for
some relevant implicit content—namely, background beliefs or knowledge we import
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into the story, unless those logically follow from the explicit content. On the other
hand, it imports too much—namely, any logical and metaphysical truth.
Lewis’s Analysis 1 piggy-backs on the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals:
it takes the worlds of the ﬁction as those that are closest, or most similar, to our own
reality, whilst respecting what’s stated explicitly in the text. Call the worlds where f is
told as known fact, ‘f-worlds’; those where some sentence A is true, ‘A-worlds’; those
where the explicit content obtains and A holds, ‘fA-worlds’. Analysis 1 goes thus:
˹Inf, A˺ is true iff there is an fA-world that is, on balance, more similar to our world
than any f-world that is not an A-world.
Because we have only possible worlds, we still import every logical and metaphysical
truth into any ﬁction. Also, where Analysis 0 did not allow for enough imports, Analy-
sis 1 seems to allow for too many (see, for example, Currie [1990] and Proudfoot
[2006]). Where ‘SH’ stands for the Sherlock Holmes stories, consider this:
 InSH, Trump wins the presidential election in 2016.
By Analysis 1, this is true iff some SH-world w in which Trump wins the election in
2016 is closer to our world than is any SH-world where Trump does not. With there
being such a w, one is saying that SH-stories are, and were at the time of writing, about
Trump and our future. But how can the SH-stories be about (say) ﬂying cars in 2160?
Call this the aboutness-objection.
Lewis’s Analysis 2 restricts the worlds at which we look, not to those objectively
most similar to the actual one, but to the subjectively most plausible given the overt
beliefs of storytellers and their contemporary audience (the ‘community of origin’ of
the ﬁction). Overt beliefs are what almost everyone believes, what almost everyone
believes that almost everyone believes, and so on. Some false things may count as true
in a story because they were among the overt but false beliefs of the author and the
audience. Take some mediaeval tale never stating explicitly that the Sun revolves
around the Earth: one may still want to count this as true in the tale, because it was an
overt belief at the time.
Call the worlds where all of the overt beliefs of the community of origin of the story
are realized, ‘overt-belief worlds’. Analysis 2 goes thus: ˹Inf, A˺ is true iff, for every
overt-belief world w, there is an fA-world that is closer to w than is any f-world that is
not an A-world. As there are overt-belief worlds where Trump wins the election and
overt-belief worlds where he doesn’t, it is neither the case that in the SH stories he wins
the election, nor the case that in the SH stories he doesn’t. Although this helps with the
Trump problem, it’s still the case that in the SH stories either Trump is elected as presi-
dent or he isn’t. The aboutness-objection strikes again.
Analysis 2 may also import actually false beliefs into stories in which these beliefs are
false as well [Bonomi and Zucchi 2003]. Take a novel written in Nazi Germany by a
progressive author, Kurt, opposing the regime. Suppose that the main character,
Shlomi, is Jewish, while the antagonist, Becker, is a Nazi. Analysis 2 makes true in the
story that Shlomi is a lesser human being than Becker. This doesn’t seem to be true in
the story, given Kurt’s convictions.
The aboutness-objection and the import of logical-metaphysical truths are difﬁcul-
ties affecting all of Analyses 0, 1, and 2: they are spin-offs of Lewis’s having only
possible worlds in his analyses. In the next section, we reach the main trouble with this
set-up.
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3. Inconsistent Fictions
Each Lewisian analysis requires possible worlds where the story is told as known fact.
But it doesn’t seem to be the case that we can tell something as known fact if it is
impossible: knowledge implies truth. If there are no possible worlds where f is told as
known fact, then ˹Inf, A˺ is vacuously true for any A. Watson’s war wound in some
Holmes stories is on his shoulder; in others, it’s in his knee. It’s also a given that he
only has one wound. One wound that is two wounds? Then everything comes out true
in the Holmes stories.
Lewis [1983] proposes two solutions—the method of union and the method of inter-
section. We can look at what’s true (according to Analysis 1 or 2) in some, or in all, of
the maximally consistent fragments of an inconsistent story. On the former method,
it’s true in the Holmes stories that Watson’s only war wound is on his shoulder and it’s
true in the stories that his only war wound is on his knee, but the conjunction of the
two is not true in the stories. On the latter method, neither is true.
But some inconsistencies in ﬁction are no narrative oversight [Priest 1997: 575–6]:
Carefully, I broke the tape and removed the lid. The sunlight streamed through the window into
the box, illuminating its contents, or lack of them. For some moments I could do nothing but
gaze, mouth agape. At ﬁrst, I thought that it must be a trick of the light, but more careful inspec-
tion certiﬁed that it was no illusion. The box was absolutely empty, but also had something in it.
Fixed to its base was a small ﬁgurine, carved of wood, Chinese inﬂuence, Southeast Asian
maybe.
I put the lid back on the box and sat down hard on the armchair, my mental states in some dis-
array. I focused on the room. It appeared normal. My senses seemed to be functioning properly.
I focused on myself. I appeared normal. No signs of incipient insanity. Maybe, I thought, it was
some Asian conjuring trick. Gently, I reopened the box and gazed inside.… The box was really
empty and occupied at the same time. The sense of touch conﬁrmed this.
In Graham Priest’s Sylvan’s Box, the narrator is Priest himself, or a ﬁctional version of
him. As author, he asks us: what’s true in this ﬁction? Taking the narrator’s explicit
statements at face value, it is true in Sylvan’s Box that Priest discovers a box that is
empty but has something in it. The obtaining of a contradiction is essential for under-
standing the story. But neither the method of intersection nor that of union deliver that
it’s true in Sylvan’s Box that a box is fempty (both full and empty).
Hanley [2004] and Nolan [2007] have challenged the view that a contradiction’s
being true in Sylvan’s Box is essential to the plot. Both opt for a reading under which
the narrator, Priest, falsely believes that there is a fempty box. But, ﬁrst, such an
interpretation doesn’t help to make sense of Priest’s description of how everything
appears normal when not looking into the box, the fact that his sense of touch con-
ﬁrms his belief, and that his colleague conﬁrms Priest’s perception. The interpreta-
tion is a result of considerations on how to consistently make sense of what
is explicitly stated. It is some inference to the best explanation—where ‘best’, for
Hanley and Nolan, means or entails ‘as close as possible to the real world’. This posi-
tion seems to be motivated by the fact that, up until Priest opens the box, the story
is perfectly realistic.
But so are many of Stephen King’s stories. Still, not each of his works supports the
hypothesis that the narrator is unreliable, the protagonist is merely going insane, or is
in a nightmare. Sometimes, the best interpretation is that a realistic story-line suddenly
turns into something sharply diverging from our reality. Why not so in Priest’s case?
Many theories of interpretation put emphasis on the text and what’s written down
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explicitly. So, what’s the best inference is what stays as close as possible to the explicit
text. And an inference to that kind of best explanation does not support the hypothesis
of Priest having a false belief or being an unreliable narrator.
Second, even if the interpretation worked for Sylvan’s Box, there seem to be other
cases—for example, the movie Last Action Hero (LAH) [Proudfoot 2006]—where a
character that in LAH is ﬁctional, in LAH becomes human. So, in LAH, he’s human
and ﬁctional—a metaphysical impossibility. Claiming that Danny, the protagonist, is
hallucinating in the story, or that the depiction on the screen is meant to be deceptive,
doesn’t make sense of the plot.
Given EXPLICIT and the truth of a contradiction in Sylvan’s Box, it is still not true in
the story that Priest ﬁnds himself levitating, dressed in a tutu. Yet that would be classi-
cally entailed by the box’s being fempty. So, what’s true in this ﬁction isn’t closed under
classical entailment. Priest has it that ‘the logic of the story must be paraconsistent’
[Priest 1997: 580]. It seems that some inferential principles must apply. In the story, the
box is empty. And, in the story, the box has something in it. Those truths of the ﬁction
are, strictly speaking, not explicit in the text. What’s explicit is their conjunction
(expressed with ‘but’). Yet it seems clear that the conjuncts are also true in the ﬁction.
Further exploration of the text may provide evidence that the standard introduction
and elimination rules for conjunction, disjunction, and the conditional, plus double
negation introduction and elimination, are all ﬁne in Sylvan’s Box. This might give rea-
son to think that the logic of this ﬁction is some paraconsistent logic—for instance,
LP! by Girard and Tanaka [2016], to which we shall return.
However, we have to distinguish between the question of what the logic is of a par-
ticular work of ﬁction, such as Sylvan’s Box, and the question of what the general logic
is of ﬁctional operators. It is the latter, if there is such a thing, that deserves the label
‘the logic of ﬁction’. The former is, rather, the logic of a ﬁction. Now, we are not sure
that any logic may be singled out as the logic of ﬁction: for any ﬁction obeying logic L,
we may be able to write a logical ﬁction where some principle or other of L fails. Our
modelling, to which we come in the next section, should allow for the possibility of
any logic (save perhaps for the trivial logic whose only validity is the entailment from
A to A) failing in some ﬁction.
4. A Formal Semantics
Our account is based on Lewis’s Analysis 2, expanded via the addition of (a) impossible
worlds and (b) an apparatus modelling our understanding of ﬁction as a kind of belief
revision. Let us have a domain of possible and impossible worlds, totally ordered by a
plausibility relation, as in the semantics for doxastic and epistemic logics of belief revi-
sion (see, for example, Grove [1988] and Segerberg [1995, 2001]). Think of the ordering
in terms of nested spheres around a core, as in the standard Lewis semantics for coun-
terfactuals, except that the spheres don’t model objective similarity. They model subjec-
tive plausibility, or degrees of belief entrenchment. The innermost sphere is the set of
worlds that realize certain beliefs. The closer the other worlds are to the core, the more
plausible they are for the relevant agent(s): they are more likely to be embraced as fall-
back positions after belief revision induced by new information.
To the best of our knowledge, the application of impossible world semantics to truth
in ﬁction has never been worked out in formal detail, the closest being Priest [1997].
The only modellings of which we are aware that use ideas from formal belief revision
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theory are Rapaport and Shapiro [1995] and Klassen et al. [2017]. Our work differs
from both of these in the use of soft upgrades for belief revision, the consideration of
common belief, and the use of impossible worlds.6
Nichols and Stich [2003] give a cognitive model of pretence that resembles ideas
from belief revision theory. Acts of pretence in imagination have a deliberate starting
point: ‘an initial premiss or set of premises, which are the basic assumptions about
what is to be pretended’ [ibid.: 24]. But also, ‘children and adults elaborate the pretend
scenarios in ways that are not inferential at all’, integrating the explicit content with ‘an
increasingly detailed description of what the world would be like if the initiating repre-
sentation were true’ [ibid.: 26–8]. Our cognitive architecture, according to Nichols and
Stich, comprises an (im)possible world box accessed when we engage in the pretence via
the pretence premises, and a belief box from which we select background beliefs to
import in order to integrate the pretended scenario. We then consider those worlds
where the pretence premises plus the imported beliefs obtain (and are closed under
some logic). However, according to Nichols and Stich, we quarantine the pretence
premises by indexing them, so that we know how to reroll the update after the pretence.
In our formal modelling, we omit the indexing for simplicity. The overall content of the
pretence is what holds in the worlds where the explicit pretence premises are true, and
which are the most plausible in terms of our background beliefs, adjusted to make
room for the explicit pretence premise itself.
Now, this looks a lot like the soft upgrades of doxastic-epistemic logics of belief revi-
sion [van Benthem 2007; Baltag and Smets 2011]:7 agents order the set of worlds, based
on how strongly they take the various worlds as candidates for actuality compared to
the state they are in (see van Ditmarsch [2005]).
Let ‘w’ stand for such ordering, and read ‘v w u’ as ‘v is at least as plausible with
respect to w as u’ (for a given agent). One typical kind of soft upgrade has it that incom-
ing new information A gives a new ordering wA such that, for all worlds v and u, if A
is true in v and A is not true in u, then v wA u. Let W be the set of all worlds. If, for
every u 2 S W, we have that v w u (or v wA u), we say that v is w-minimal
(wA-minimal) in S, or simply minimal in S if the ordering and the subset are clear
from context.
Now just think of an agent reading a ﬁction as facing new information with every
sentence it is reading, thus sequentially upgrading its beliefs with each sentence of the
ﬁction. The agent need not actually believe what it is reading. One can easily incorpo-
rate the aforementioned quarantining suggested by Nichols and Stich by indexing the
worlds by their previous position in the ordering. When the agent stops engaging with
the ﬁction and is checked for its actual beliefs, it will recover the old ordering based on
the index.8
6 Thanks to Toryn Klassen for pointing out these references.
7 Girard and Tanaka [2016] provide a general approach for belief revision in any many-valued logic, with an
emphasis on LP. Hence, they model belief revision with a non-normal base logic. We return to this below.
8 Alternatively, one can index the sentences with which it upgraded and, when rerolling the upgrade, it will
upgrade with the negation of the indexed sentences. In this way, one could also incorporate ideas from Searle
[1975] and Currie[1990], where the reader recognizes the intention of the author as to whether a sentence is sup-
posed to be make-believed or believed. If the agent is supposed to believe A, it might upgrade not with the
indexed Abut rather with A itself and, when rerolling the upgrade, A-worlds that are also candidates for the real
world will be more plausible than before reading the ﬁction. Thus, the agent has learned something new through
the ﬁction.
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Lewis’s Analysis 2 refers to the overt beliefs of the community of origin. We change
this in two ways. First, rather than overt beliefs we take common ones: that is, the beliefs
such that everyone has them, everyone believes that everyone has them, and so on. This
is a merely practical choice: it avoids the ‘most’ quantiﬁer coming with overt beliefs for
a plain ‘all’ in our analysis below. Second, we take the community of interpretation of a
work of ﬁction, instead of that of origin. We want to model this community’s reasoning
on the ﬁction. Such a shift of focus will turn out to be useful to address a dilemma that
we will meet in the following section. Overall, when we evaluate ˹Inf, A˺ for truth we
look at all those worlds, possible or not, that are minimal with respect to the common
belief worlds of the community of interpretation after the upgrade with the explicit
content of f.
Take a propositional language L with the usual set of atoms AT, negation :, con-
junction ^, disjunction _, a strict conditional , modal operators } and &, and a fam-
ily of ‘in ﬁction f’-operators (one for each f), Inf. The well-formed formulas are the
atoms plus, if A and B are formulas:
:A j ðA^BÞ j ðA_BÞ j ðABÞ j&B j }B j Inf ; A
The explicit content F of ﬁction f is a ﬁnite sequence of sentences that express what is
expressed by telling f as known fact rather than as ﬁction. Thus, it goes beyond the lit-
eral meaning of f via a treatment of metaphor, irony, etc., that we suppose is given by
pragmatics. We also write, abusing notation, ^A2FA for F. Thus, we treat the explicit
content as a ﬁnite conjunction.
A multi-agent plausibility frame is a tupleℱ = <W, N, Ag, {waj w2W, a2Ag}>.W
is a set of worlds, N is the set of normal-possible worlds, W–N is the set of non-normal
worlds, Ag is a ﬁnite set of agents, each wa is agent a’s plausibility ordering on W in
state w. We assume each wa to be transitive and well-founded: for every set of worlds
SW, we can always determine the most plausible worlds in S: wa -min(S) = {v2Sj
8x2S: v wa x} 6¼ {}. Well-foundedness of wa guarantees that it is a reﬂexive and total
order on W. The latter means that any two worlds are comparable. We deﬁne v w<a u
iff. v wa u and not u wa v. We deﬁne v wﬃa u iff. v wa u and u wav.
A frame becomes a modelℳ = <W, N, Ag, {waj w2W, a2Ag}, r> when endowed
with an evaluation relation r, relating at worlds the atoms in AT to truth (‘rwp1’), fal-
sity, (‘rwp0 ’), both, or neither – this mirrors the ‘relational semantics’ for the logic of
First Degree Entailment, and its expansions (see Priest [2008]).
Before we extend r to the whole language, let us justify why we use an FDE-based
framework. The previous section motivated that r can relate worlds to both truth val-
ues. That r can relate a world to neither truth value is based on the following ideas.
First, if there are stories that make contradictions true because we adhere to EXPLICIT,
we do not see an immediate reason to deny that one could write a story f s.t. Inf,
:(A_:A) by explicitly writing such a story. Second, given the aboutness objection, we
might say that every ﬁction remains incomplete wrt some sentences; not only in the
sense of :Inf, A ^:Inf,:A (cf. note 5) but in the sense that all f-worlds are incomplete
worlds wrt A—they do not decide A because the story isn’t about A at all, and so aren’t
any of the story-worlds. Finally, Bourne and Caddick [2016] have argued that time in
ﬁction requires the indeterminate truth value. Our framework provides the option of
modelling all these.
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If one is not convinced by these arguments, one could rely on a dynamics on top of a
static LP-base, as developed by Girard and Tanaka [2016]. They provide a general set-
ting suitable for any many-valued logic. So, our approach could be seen as a special
case. However, as we explain below, we deﬁne beliefs, common beliefs, and the upgrade
for the meta-language to account for the truth-conditions of Inf, A, whereas they pro-
vide a semantics for belief and upgrade in the object-language. Nevertheless, their
approach seems to be applicable to the issue of truth in ﬁction, using our idea of model-
ling truth in ﬁction as soft upgrades on a non-classical static base.
We extend r to the whole language as follows. For the extensional connectives we
have, for all w2N,
(S1:) rw(:A)1 iff. rw A0
(S2:) rw(:A)0 iff. rwA1
(S1^) rw(A^B)1 iff. rwA1 and rwB1
(S2^) rw(A^B)0 iff. rwA0 or rwB0
(S1_) rw(A_B)1 iff. rwA1 or rwB1
(S2_) rw(A_B)0 iff. rwA0 and rwB0
The familiar modalities get their usual (S5) clauses, over normal worlds. For all w2N,
(S1) rw(AB)1 iff. for all v2N, if rvA1, then rvB1
(S2) rw(AB)0 iff. for some v2N, rvA1, and rvB0
(S1&) rw&A1 iff. for all v2N, rvA1
(S2&) rw&A0 iff. for some v2N, rvA0
(S1}) rw}A1 iff. for some v2N, rvA1
(S2}) rw} 0 iff. for all v2N, rvA0
We say that A is a logical consequence of a set of formulas G (G W A) iff, for every
w2N in every modelℳ, whenever, for all B2G , rwB1, then rwA1. A is a logical truth iff
{} W A.
We impose a (so-called) Classicality Condition: for every w2N and every atom p, we
have rwp1 or rwp0 but not both. This extends to every formula by induction. As for
worlds in W–N, at them r relates logically complex formulas to truth values directly,
not recursively (this is a common move in impossible worlds semantics: see, again,
Priest [2008]). Worlds inW–N are not subject to the Classicality Condition.
The following version of Nolan’s principle [Nolan 1997] allows us to have enough
worlds at our disposal in the models:
NP. For any two formulas A, B, there are worlds w, v2W, such that rwA1 and not rvB1.
We deﬁne the notion of common belief in our metalanguage as follows. Agent a
believes a formula A at w2N, Bela A (at w2N), if A is true in every world in wa-min
(W), the worlds that a considers most plausible in the model from state w2N. Everyone
in a group G of agents believes a formula A (at a w2N), EGA, iff ^a2g Bela A is true at
w: that is, everyone in fact believes A at w. Let us abbreviate EGEG
n-1A with EnGA, and
deﬁne E0GA = A. Then A is commonly believed in a group G (at w2N), CBelGA, iff ^i =
1
1EiA is true at w in the model: that is, (at w) everyone believes A, and everyone
believes that everyone believes A, and so on.
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A world v2W is a common belief world of a group G at world w if everything that’s
commonly believed at w is true at v. So, v is a common belief world of group G at world
w if, for every A such that at w it is true that CBelGA, A is true at v. Let us denote the set
of common belief worlds at w by jCBelGwj.
A soft upgrade with A reorders the worlds in such a way that all of those in which A
is true are then considered more plausible than all of those where A is not true. We
obtain the new ordering as follows, where A is from F of f:
(C1) For all u, v2W, if ruA1 and it is not the case that rvA1, then uwaA v.
(C2) Otherwise, the old ordering remains.
Given NP, we have some world in the model in which A is true. So, the upgraded rela-
tion will be non-empty. Also, it preserves transitivity and well-foundedness.
We can add additional constraints on waA: for example, that (non-normal)
worlds that make A true and false are less plausible than those making A only
true. Or, if the agent follows some pragmatic rules of interpretation, certain worlds
obeying those rules might be considered more plausible (for such a pragmatic-
based approach, see Bonomi and Zucchi [2003]). But for simplicity, let’s just stay
with the above conditions.
We are interested in a multi-agent setting, but, given the individual orderings, it is
no trivial task to come up with a group ordering G. This should reﬂect how the agents
can agree, for every set of worlds, on some set of most plausible or preferred worlds.
This amounts to a voting problem among inﬁnitely many, or at least arbitrarily ﬁnitely
many, alternatives. One has to be aware here of the impossibility result for social choice
functions shown by Arrow [1950] and the analogue for belief revision shown by Leitgeb
and Segerberg [2007]. Both assume certain plausible conditions on the group of agents,
and then show that a group preference ordering cannot be obtained. One of these con-
ditions is non-dictatorship, which, on some theory of interpretation, might be relaxed
to give some priority to the author’s ordering. This is the way we go here, assuming a
hierarchy among the agents a0, …, an where a lower index indicates a higher rank.
9
Let Gi be the group of agents from a0 up to and including agent ai and F as the explicit
content. Then we generalize wGF, the group ordering after revising with the explicit
content of the ﬁction, as follows:
wG0F¼wa0F
wGnþ1F¼w<GnF [ ðwﬃGnF \ wanþ1FÞ
If, for every agent a2Gi, the individual orders are transitive and well-founded and sat-
isfy C1 and C2, then it can be shown that wGF is transitive, well-founded, and satisﬁes
C1and C2. (As an alternative to giving up non-dictatorship, one can plug in one’s
9 The interpretation of the ranking is actually difﬁcult, as ranking by competence leads to taking into account a
less competent agent when the more competent one is indecisive. However, one might say that it is a ranking
based on authority, where the author comes ﬁrst and then the respective literary experts follow. This presumes a
particular theory of interpretation, giving a special role to the author, which can indeed be challenged (see, e.g.,
Barthes [1977] and Gendler [2011]). We lack the space to address the challenge in this paper.
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favourite method of giving up conditions on the orderings to obtain a group ordering
and to avoid the impossibility results.)
With this group ordering, we can, for every S W and A from F, have this:
wGA-min Sð Þ ¼ v 2 S j 8x 2 S : vwGAx
 
This is the set of worlds considered most plausible by the group with respect to the set S
after upgrading with A.
Here comes, ﬁnally, our deﬁnition of truth in ﬁction. For w2N,
S1 Inf
 
rw Inf ; A
 
1 iff ; for every world v2wGA-min jCBelGw jð Þ; ðrvF1) rvA1Þ
S2 Inf
 
rw Inf ; A
 
0 iff not rw Inf ; A
 
1
By ‘rvF1 ’, we mean to express that the explicit content of f is true at v (qua being
told as known fact at v). Thus, A is true in ﬁction f iff every f-world, considered
by group G most plausible with respect to the common beliefs of G after revising
with the explicit content of the ﬁction, makes A true (and dually for the falsity
condition). We have Inf, ^A2FA (Inf, F) as a validity. The proof is obvious. If, in f,
conjunction elimination holds, then, for every A2F, Inf, A is also a validity. Again,
the proof is obvious.
As a consequence, to deny that it’s true in Sylvan’s Box that there is a box that is
empty and not empty, InSB, (A^:A), one has to argue for why the explicit occurrence
of ˹A^:A˺ is not sufﬁcient for InSB, (A^:A). Hence, truth in ﬁction becomes, at least
in this case, dependent on theories of interpretation. We consider this a result that ade-
quately models our reasoning about truth in ﬁction.
However, the logic will in general be very weak, for we have impossible worlds
around. Counterexamples are easily given by choosing a(n impossible) world among
the best worlds after the upgrade, and setting up the ordering and valuation just right.
As we mentioned before, one can put further constraints on the upgraded plausibility
ordering, which would likely generate more validities.
Having impossible worlds among the best ones helps a lot. Engaging with Sylvan’s
Box (SB) does not require us to revise our ordering much—up to the point where the
fempty box appears. We say that the most plausible worlds are those where Priest has
the right belief, and there actually is a fempty box, without trivialization. Easily, the
inference from Inf, (A^:A) to Inf, B does not go through, speciﬁcally when the contra-
diction is part of the explicit content as per typical blatantly inconsistent ﬁctions.
Here is a formal counterexample. For simplicity, we consider only two agents: Priest,
p, and Nolan, n. So, G = {p, n}. Let the hierarchy between agents be p, n, for p is the
author of SB. Let A be ‘the box is empty.’ The arrowhead points to the world considered
at least as plausible wrt w. We omit reﬂexive arrows. Let w be the actual world. Here is
the initial (toy)10 model for SB:
Everyone considers the actual world most plausible. Nolan is indifferent between
worlds that both make a contradiction true.
10 There are going to be further worlds in the countermodels, in order for them to comply with NP. We don’t
specify them, for they don’t do work, as far as exhibiting invalidities is concerned.
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At w, the agents believe A, and also at w it is commonly believed that A. The worlds
v and u are also common belief worlds. After upgrading with A^:A we get the follow-
ing model:
As p was not indifferent between any worlds, the group ordering collapses into its
individual upgraded ordering. Hence, we give maximal priority to the author’s inten-
tions. The most plausible common belief world that makes A^:A true is v, and so Inf,
(A^:A) holds at w. But, at v, B does not hold. Hence, Inf, B is not true at w.
If we changed the hierarchy among p and n to n, p, the upgraded model would in
fact remain the same, for the indifference of n between u and v is resolved by p’s
upgraded ordering.
The Last Action Hero case is modelled in a similar way. The most plausible worlds
are going to be inconsistent but non-explosive. Moreover, non-normal or impossible
worlds in our setting allow for any (non-trivial) logic to fail, and so not all tautologies
will come out true in every story, taking into account Proudfoot’s [2006] worry.
What about accidental contradictions? We treat the explicit content as one big con-
junction. So, if both conjuncts explicitly occur in the explicit content, we most likely
need to eliminate several other conjuncts and maybe even introduce a conjunction
again. Since we have impossible worlds around, conjunction introduction or elimina-
tion might fail for this particular case. Moreover, even if we accept that their conjunc-
tion is true, we might be in a non-explosive world.
5. Answering Objections
We close by discussing, in this order: unreliable narration; the assumption of the plausi-
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While unreliable narration and non-literal speech may pose complications in our
framework, too, these issues have troubling counterparts in the general modelling of
communication of real agents and are thus not really a problem speciﬁc to narrators,
or depiction in movies. Consider a coin tossing game with three players: Alicia, Bono,
and Circe (a, b, c). Suppose that b is tossing the coin and takes a peek. a and c see
this, but they do not peek. b says, ‘The coin shows Heads.’ How do they know that b
is reliable? They usually simply assume it. If they have evidence that he’s not, they
might not upgrade their belief system or they might, but index this particular move
somehow. The communication between narrator and reader, it seems to us, is similar
to real communication: solutions to the coin-toss case might be transferable to the
case of ﬁction.
Next, the plausibility ordering: just like the Lewisian similarity ordering between
possible worlds, this is rather vague. Moreover, assuming that agents come equipped
with such an order is a fairly strong move. Here are some responses concerning this
objection. First, it is fairly standard in contemporary epistemic-doxastic logic to
assume such orderings. If one objects to plausibility orderings in general, one has to
object to the whole mainstream approach to belief revision of epistemic-doxastic
logic, too. Second, in the debate about truth in ﬁction, everyone is already implicitly
assuming some plausibility ordering on worlds. Any analysis of truth in ﬁction is
evaluated against our intuitions about what is true in a ﬁction (see the objections
above against Analyses 1 and 2). But such intuitions are never justiﬁed when used to
evaluate the analysis. We entertain certain scenarios, where we pretend that the story
obtains, and then wonder whether it is intuitively true in this scenario that A or not.
But how can we say that it is intuitively not true in the Holmes stories that Trump
wins the election in 2016? Or that it is intuitively true in the Holmes stories that
Holmes, when reasoning deductively, is reasoning classically? It is because we, as
interpreters, consider one interpretation more plausible than another. (Closer to
Lewis: we, as interpreters, believe that the community of origin of f considered one
interpretation more plausible than another.) Hence, we claim, this appeal to intuition
in the debate is an appeal to plausibility among interpretations. We model this as a
plausibility ordering on worlds.
This leads to another possible objection: our analysis makes truth in ﬁction too com-
munity-dependent. Lewis, but also Currie and others, seems to assume that there is a
fact of the matter to what’s true in a story and that an analysis of truth in ﬁction should
reveal this. Folde [2015] argues that correct interpretations give us epistemic access to
what’s true in the ﬁction, and correct interpretations are grounded in what’s true in the
ﬁction.
First, though, it’s not entirely clear whether the assumption that there’s a fact of the
matter to what’s true in a story is right. In particular, it is unclear whether there is a
fact of the matter to what is the implicit content of a story. Some conclusions about
what’s true in a ﬁction, as noted by Hanley [2004], are probably true or supported by
inductive arguments. But we can most certainly go to the literary studies department
and ﬁnd many works of ﬁction for which there are competing interpretations giving us
competing claims about what’s true in the ﬁction. It might be unfeasible to determine
which of the interpretations is actually tracking the facts of the matter, assuming that
there is such a thing. So, even if there is a fact of the matter concerning the implicit con-
tent of a story, it’s only accessible through our interpretation and our background
information.
AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 13
The open issue here can be formulated as a dilemma:11 either, strictly speaking,
nothing is true in a ﬁction independent of interpretation (ours, or the relevant com-
munity’s), and rather, while reading ﬁction, we provide an interpretation: by doing so,
we ﬁx what’s true in the story. Or, if ﬁctions instead come with a fact of the matter ﬁxed
in the corresponding ﬁctional worlds, then while interpreting we try to discover these
facts.
Neither option seems satisfying. The former treats truth in ﬁction as too dependent
on the community of interpretation, and fails to ﬁt the phenomenology that we have
when reading, which is that we are discovering something about the ﬁctional world(s).
The latter leads to epistemic difﬁculties. How could we ever know that we have discov-
ered the facts with our interpretation, given that there is at least one competing, but
equally well justiﬁed, interpretation contradicting ours?
We think that our analysis provides a good model of literary theory practice and of
how truth in ﬁction is approached there. If there’s disagreement in the community of
interpretation, then we can account for this disagreement, because we refer to the com-
munity of interpretation in the world of evaluation, and not to that of origin. It’s simply
undecided whether it’s true in the story that A or :A because the most plausible worlds
are going to contain A-worlds and :A-worlds.
The worry from Bonomi and Zucchi [2003] was with the community of origin’s
common beliefs being imported into the story. As the group ordering is based on the
hierarchy of agents of the community, depending on who gets the highest ranking, we
might block their objection. The easiest way is to give highest authority to the author.
Another way is to consider, as we did, the community of interpretation, instead of the
community of origin. It will then revise with the ﬁction’s explicit content and can,
before engaging with the ﬁction, consider genre conventions or other pragmatic criteria
to reorder the worlds. In particular, some of the common beliefs of the community of
origin might be considered, and used to reorder the worlds that the community of
interpretation considers. However, the latter might be resisting the import of certain
moral judgments of the community of origin.
Thus, our view may also allow us to model imaginative resistance [Gendler 2000].
We don’t have the room to discuss imaginative resistance in detail, but here are some
thoughts, by way of conclusion. Gendler believes that we are unwilling to make-believe
that eating babies is morally right, due to an exportation principle: if we make-believe
that eating babies is morally right, we are seemingly justiﬁed in exporting this as a
moral truth simpliciter. One may model this, in our model, by adding a moral modality
[MOK] (‘It is morally OK that’), designating the actual world @2N, and stipulating
that if r@(:[MOK] A)1 and rw([MOK]A)1 then w is always ranked below any f-world
where :[MOK] A.12
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